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Davis and Palmer: Labor Law
A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH

Special]

XIV. LABOR LAW
A.

State CapitolEmployees

Justice McHugh decided whether the janitorial services for state capitol
buildings could be performed by private contractors in the case of O'Connor v.
Margolin.09 The court held:
W.Va. Code, 5A-4-1 [1969], which requires that the Director of
the General Services Division of the Department of Finance and
Administration furnish janitors for the maintenance of the State
capitol buildings and grounds in Charleston, West Virginia,
requires that janitors so retained be State employees, and the
Commissioner of Finance and Administration and the Director of
the General Services Division of that Department are without
authority to terminate the employment of such employees as a
class for the purpose of obtaining
the same type janitorial service
810
through private contracting.
McHugh concluded in O'Connorthat "W.Va. Code, 5A-4-1 [1969], which
requires that the janitors employed pursuant to that statute be State employees, was
not amended by way of the funding provisions in the State budget for fiscal year
1983, to provide that such janitorial services may be secured to the State by private
contracting." 81 1
B.

At-Will Employment

In Cook v. Heck's Inc., 812 Justice McHugh addressed the potential impact
of language in an employee handbook on the status of an at-will employee. It was
said initially that "[c]ontractual provisions relating to discharge or job security may
alter the at will status of a particular employee. 8 13 Justice McHugh noted that
"[g]enerally, the existence of a contract is a question of fact for the jury. 81 4
Turning to the central issue of the case, Justice McHugh held that
[a] promise of job security contained in an employee handbook
distributed by an employer to its employees constitutes an offer
for a unilateral contract; and an employee's continuing to work,
809

296 S.E.2d 892 (W. Va. 1982).

810

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

811

Id. at Syl. PL 3.

812

342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986).

813

Id.at SylPt. 3.

814

X at Syl. Pt. 4.
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while under no obligation to do so, constitutes an acceptance and
sufficient consideration to make the employer's promise binding
and enforceable.815
The court concluded that "[a]n employee handbook may form the basis of
a unilateral contract if there is a definite promise therein by
the employer not to
816
discharge covered employees except for specified reasons.
C.

Retaliatory Discharge

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of discharging an employee in
retaliation for exercising constitutional rights in the case of McClung v. Marion
County Commission.817 It is important to note the defendant in the case was a public
employer. Justice McHugh held initially that
[i]t is in contravention of substantial public policies for an
employer to discharge an employee in retaliation for the
employee's exercising his or her state constitutional rights to
petition for redress of grievances (W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 16) and
to seek access to the courts of this State (W. Va. Const. Art. I, §
17) by filing an action, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 21-5C-8 [1975],
for overtime wages.818
It was noted for summary judgment purposes that "[w]hether the
defendant in a retaliatory discharge case acted wantonly, willfully or maliciously is
a function peculiarly within the province of the fact finder., 819 In McClung, the
court allocated the burdens in a retaliatory discharge case as follows:
In a retaliatory discharge action, where the plaintiff claims that he
or she was discharged for exercising his or her constitutional
right(s), the burden is initially upon the plaintiff to show that the
exercise of his or her constitutional right(s) was a substantial or a
motivating factor for the discharge. The plaintiff need not show
that the exercise of the constitutional right(s) was the only
precipitating factor for the discharge. The employer may defeat
the claim by showing that the employee would have been

815

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

816

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

817

360 S.E.2d 221 (W. Va. 1987).

818

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

819

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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8 20
discharged even in the absence of the protected conduct.

D.

MaintainingSafe Work Environment
8 21
Justice McHugh held in United Mine Workers of America v. Faerber

that
"full roof bolting" is required to be utilized in all underground
coal mine sections in this State using auger-type continuous coal
mining equipment, under W.Va. Code, 22A-2-25(a) [1985], which
provides that "[t]he roof and ribs of all active underground
roadways, travelways, and working places shall be supported or
otherwise controlled adequately to protect persons from falls of
the roof or ribs." 8
E.

Job Description

In Cruciotti v. McNeel,823 Justice McHugh addressed employment of a
person as a teacher and athletic trainer. The court held that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 18A-4-16 [1982], the duties of an
athletic trainer are within the definition of "extracurricular
duties," and, therefore, the assignment of a teacher to such duties
shall be made only by mutual agreement of the teacher and the
superintendent, or designated representative. A teacher's contract
of employment shall be separate from an agreement to perform
duties as an athletic trainer and such contract shall not be
conditioned upon the teacher's acceptance or continuance of such
extracurricular assignment as athletic trainer, which has been
proposed by the superintendent, a designated representative, or the
board of education. 24
F.

Employee Privacy

The issue of an employee's right to refuse to submit to a polygraph test
required by an employer was addressed in Cordle v. GeneralHugh Mercer Corp.825
820

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

821

365 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1986).

822

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 (alteration in original).

823

396 S.E.2d 191 (W. Va. 1990).

824

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

825

325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984).
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Justice McHugh held:
It is contrary to the public policy of West Virginia for an employer
to require or request that an employee submit to a polygraph test
or similar test as a condition of employment, and although the
rights of employees under that public policy are not absolute, in
that under certain circumstances, such as those contemplated by
W.Va. Code, 21-5-5b [1983], such a polygraph test or similar test
may be permitted, the public policy against such testing is
grounded upon the recognition in this State of an individual's
interest in privacy.826
G.

Restrictive Employment Covenant

Justice McHugh determined the validity of a restrictive employment
covenant in Helms Boys, Inc. v. Brady.8 27 The court held that "[w]hen the skills and
information acquired by a former employee are of a general managerial nature,
such as supervisory, merchandising, purchasing and advertising skills and
information, a restrictive covenant in an employment contract will not be enforced
828
because such skills and information are not protectible employer interests.
H.

Employee Immunity from Tort Liability

Justice McHugh addressed immunity from tort liability granted to
employees under the workers' compensation statutes in Jenrett v. Smith. 829 The
court held that
[flor purposes of determining whether a co-employee "is acting in
furtherance of the employer's business" under W.Va. Code,
23-2-6a [1949], and thereby entitled to immunity from tort
liability, a "dual purpose" trip, that is, a journey by an employee
that serves both personal and business reasons, is a personal trip if
it would have been made even though the business aspect of the
journey was canceled. However, it is a business trip if the journey
would have gone forward even though the personal errand was
canceled. In any event, if the injury or death of an employee
prevents the trip from going forward, the journey may still be a
business trip if the business task would have been done by some

826

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

827

297 S.E.2d 840 (W. Va. 1982).

828

Id. at Syl.

829

315 S.E.2d 583 (W. Va. 1983).
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other employee at some other time.8 °
I.

Unemployment Compensation

Justice McHugh held in Kisamore v. Rutledge8 1 that "[flindings of fact
and conclusions of law by an arbitrator in an employment dispute matter are not
binding upon the West Virginia Department of Employment Security or the courts
of this State. ' ' 12 The court went on to hold:
Where an employee is suspended from his employment for
disciplinary reasons and his reinstatement to employment is
conditional, in that work must be available and the employee must
pass a physical examination, and during the suspension period the
employee performs no services and no wages are payable to him
from the suspending employer, such employee is "otherwise"
separated from employment within the meaning of W.Va. Code,
21A-1-3, and such employee is totally unemployed and eligible to
receive unemployment compensation benefits.'
In Lough v. Cole, 4 Justice McHugh determined whether an employee
who leaves an employer that is going out of business to find other work is
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The court held that
[w]here an employee left his employment to seek other work
because the employer was in the process of going out of business,
that employee was not disqualified from receiving unemployment
compensation benefits under the provisions of W.Va. Code,
21A-6-3(1) [1981], which section states, in part, that an individual
shall be disqualified for benefits "[f]or the week in which he left
his most recent work voluntarily without good cause involving
fault on the part of the employer and until the individual returns to
covered employment and has been employed in covered
employment at least thirty working days.""35
Justice McHugh clarified the right of a claimant to proper notice regarding
unemployment compensation benefits in Mizell v. RutledgeY 6 The court in Mizell
830

Id at Syl. Pt. 1:

831

276 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1981).

832

Il at Syl. Pt. 3.

&3

d at Syl. Pt. 2.

834

M5
836

310 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1983).
Id at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).
328 S.E.2d 514 (W. Va. 1985).
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held that
[a] notice of the decision of a deputy commissioner of the West
Virginia Department of Employment Security regarding the
disqualification of a claimant from receiving regular
unemployment compensation benefits that fails to inform the
claimant that such disqualification could render him ineligible for
extended benefits under chapter 21A, article 6A of the West
Virginia Code violates the notice requirements of W.Va. Code,
21A-7-8 [1978], which statute entitles the claimant, interalia, "to
reasonable opportunity to be heard before an
a fair hearing and
'87
appeal tribunal. 3
The case of Butler v. Rutledge 8 required Justice McHugh examine the
phrase "most recent work," in the context of determining whether a claimant is
disqualified from receiving benefits. The court made an initial general ruling:
In 1981, the West Virginia Legislature deleted from W.Va. Code,
21A-6-3(1), the provision that "work" means "employment with
the last employing unit with whom such individual was employed
as much as thirty days, whether or not such days are consecutive";
therefore, in determining whether an individual is disqualified
under W.Va. Code, 21A-6-3(1) [1981], from receiving
unemployment compensation benefits (for leaving his or her
"most recent work voluntarily without good cause involving fault
on the part of the employer"), "most recent work," in that
context, need not be employment in which the individual worked
for "thirty days" or "thirty working days"; however, once an
individual is determined to be disqualified under W.Va. Code,
21A-6-3(1) [1981], from receiving benefits, the disqualification
continues "until the individual returns to covered employment and
has been employed in covered employment at least thirty working
days," as W.Va. Code, 21A-6-3(1) [1981], further provides.8 9
Justice McHugh took Butler's general ruling and applied it to the facts of
the case. The court held:
Where individuals left their employment and took other jobs, and
the individuals, prior to working at the other jobs for thirty
working days, were laid off by their employers, the other jobs
constituted the individuals' "most recent work" for purposes of
837

Id.at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).

M

329 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1985).

839

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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determining whether they were disqualified under W.Va. Code,
21A-6-3(1) [1981], from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits. w

Relying upon the decision in Belt v. Cole, 1' Justice McHugh held in Ash v.
Rutledge 2 that
[u]nemployment compensation claimants meet statutory eligibility
requirements of "total or partial unemployment" and "availability
for work" even if they are not working because of a labor dispute.
W.Va. Code, 21A-6-3(4) must be applied to their cases to
determine whether they are disqualified or fall within an exception
to disqualification. Syllabus Points 3, 4, and 5 of Pickens v.
Kinder, 155 W.Va. 121, 181 S.E.2d 469 (1971), are overruled. 8
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of whether conduct by an employee
constituted misconduct for the purpose of unemployment compensation in the case
of Peery v. Rutledge.8 4 The court noted initially that "[d]isqualifying provisions of
the Unemployment Compensation Law are to be narrowly construed."' ' 5 The court
held:
A claimant for unemployment compensation benefits is not guilty
of disqualifying "misconduct" when the claimant refuses to
perform a job assignment because he or she reasonably and in
good faith believes that performance of the job assignment would
jeopardize the claimant's own health or safety or the health or
safety of others. 8"
Justice McHugh also indicated that
[a] claimant for unemployment compensation does not necessarily
waive the right to raise the issue of his or her reasonable and good
faith apprehension of harm to the health or safety of the claimant
or others by accepting employment with the knowledge that the

840

Id.
at Syl. PL 4.

841

305 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1983).

842

348 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1986).

843

ld.
at Syl. PL 1.

844

355 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1987).

845

Id.at Syl. Pt. 1.

846

Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
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working conditions involve a health or safety risk. 47
The court in Peery went on to set out the burden of proof when an
employer alleges an employee violated a work directive or rule. The court held that
[i]f the former employer establishes that the unemployment
compensation claimant has violated an ordinarily reasonable job
assignment directive or work rule, the burden of going forward
with the evidence shifts to the claimant to show that he or she was
justified, or at least exercised good faith, in not complying with
the directive or rule. If the claimant then introduces evidence of
his or her reasonable fear of harm to the claimant's or others'
health or safety, the former employer 848must rebut the
reasonableness of the claimant's apprehension.
In Davis v. Gatson,849 Justice McHugh wrote:
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits
only if the Commissioner finds, inter alia, that he has been totally
or partially unemployed during his benefit year for a waiting
period of one week prior to the week for which he claims benefits
for total or partial unemployment, under W.Va. Code, 21A-6-1(4)
[1994]. The terms total and partial unemployment are defined in
W.Va. Code, 21A-1-3 [1994]. However, under the definition of
wages found in W.Va. Code, 21A-1-3 [1994], the term wages shall
not include vacation pay received by an individual before or after
becoming totally or partially unemployed but earned prior to
becoming totally or partially unemployed, provided that the term
totally or partially unemployed shall not be interpreted to include
employees who are on vacation by reason of the employer's
request provided they are unequivocally so informed at least
ninety days prior to such vacation.8 °
In the case of Smittle v. Gatson,5 ' Justice McHugh examined employer
conduct to reduce wages and the employer shutdown exception for unemployment
benefits. The court held initially that
W.Va.

Code, 21A-6-3(4)

847

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

848

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

849
850

464 S.E.2d 785 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

851

465 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1995).

[1990]

allows the payment of
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unemployment benefits when "an employer shuts down his plant
or operation or dismisses his employees in order to force wage
reduction, changes in hours or working conditions." In order to
qualify for benefits under the employer shutdown exception of
W.Va. Code, 21A-6-3(4) [1990], an employee must show, first,
that the employer acted to shut down the work site, and second,
that the shutdown
was "to force" a change detrimental to the
52
employee.8
It next held that
[t]he determination of when an employer is trying "to force wage
reduction" or other changes in benefits under W.Va. Code,
21-6-3(4) [1990], is made by comparing the employer's proposed
change(s) to the status quo as shown by the expiring contract. If
the employer's proposed change(s) would result in detrimental
terms for the employee, then the employer is considered to be
seeking "to force wage reduction, changes in hours or working
conditions."8
Justice McHugh concluded in Smittle that "[u]nder W.Va. Code,
21A-6-3(4) [1990], employees are entitled to unemployment benefits when an
employer rejects continuing the expiring contract for a reasonable time 'to force
wage reduction, change in hours or working conditions."' 854
J.

Workers' Compensation

Justice McHugh held in Geeslin v. Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner85s that "[w]here an altercation arises out of the employment, the fact
that 6laimant was the aggressor does not, standing alone, bar compensation under
the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, W.Va. Code, 23-1-1 et seq., for
injuries claimant sustained in the altercation."" 5 The court in Geeslin addressed
prior precedent that was in conflict with its decision and held that "[t]he Syllabus
of Jackson v. State Compensation Commissioner, 127 W.Va. 59, 31 S.E.2d 848
(1944), is overruled. Claytor v. Compensation Commissioner, 144 W.Va. 103, 106
S.E.2d 920 (1959), and Turner v. State Compensation Commissioner, 147 W.Va.
106, 126 S.E.2d 40 (1962), are overruled to the extent they are inconsistent with the

852

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

853

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

854

Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.

855

294 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1982).

856

Id at Syl. Pt. 1.
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principles enunciated herein." 857
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of whether suicide while at work was
compensable under the workers' compensation statutes in Hall v. State Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner.858 The court held:
An employee's suicide which arises in the course of and results
from covered employment is compensable under W.Va. Code,
23-4-1 [1974], provided, (1) the employee sustained an injury
which itself arose in the course of and resulted from covered
employment, and (2) without that injury the employee would not
have developed a mental disorder of such degree as to impair the
employee's normal and rational judgment, and (3) without that
mental disorder the employee would not have committed
suicide.859
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of proper notice to an employer of
default in payment of assessed interest on past unpaid premiums in Mid-Eastern
Geotech, Inc. v. Lewis. 860 The court held:
Where an employer required to subscribe and pay premiums to the
West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund was determined by
the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Commissioner to be in
default for failure to pay interest assessed for past due quarterly
premium payments, and that employer received no notice of the
interest assessment and, nevertheless, maintained its account with
the workers' compensation fund at the level required by law by
way of the payment of premiums and the payment of periodic
account deficiencies, that employer was entitled to notice in
writing of its right, under the provisions of W. Va. Code, 23-2-5b
[1983], to apply to the Commissioner for a settlement of the
amount of the employer's default.861
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of timely processing workers'
compensation claims in Scites v. Huffinan.862 It was initially held in the opinion that
[i]n view of the policy of the West Virginia workers'
compensation system, reflected in W.Va. Code, 23-5-3a [1971],
857

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

858

303 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1983).

859

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

860

318 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1984).

861

Id. at Syl.

862

324 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1984).
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that "the rights of claimants for workmen's [now workers']
compensation be determined as speedily and expeditiously as
possible," the time limits specified in W.Va. Code, 23-5-1 [1973],
with respect to actions by the Commissioner concerning the
processing of claims for workers' compensation, are mandatory. 8 6
The court in Scites went on to elaborate as follows:
The West Virginia Workers' Compensation Commissioner and
Appeal Board are subject to the following statutory and regulatory
time requirements concerning the processing before the Board of
claims for workers' compensation benefits: (1) regular sessions of
the Board, designated as "Appeal Board Hearing Days," shall,
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 23-5-2 [1981], continue "as long as may
be necessary for the proper and expeditious transaction of the
hearings, decisions and other business before it," (2) upon appeal,
the commissioner shall, pursuant to Commissioner's regulation
ch. 23-1, series VI, 8.02 (1984), prepare and transmit claim files to
the Board "within thirty working days from the date of receipt of
notice of appeal in the Fund," (3) the Commissioner shall,
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 23-5-3 [1953], "forthwith make up a
transcript of the proceedings before him and certify and transmit
the same to the board," (4) the Board shall, pursuant to W.Va.
Code, 23-5-3 [1953], review actions of the Commissioner "at its
next meeting after the filing of notice of appeal, provided such
notice of appeal shall have been filed thirty days before such
meeting of the board, unless such review be postponed by
agreement of parties or by the board for good cause" and (5)
"[a]ll appeals from the action of the commissioner shall [pursuant
to W.Va. Code, 23-5-3 [1953]] be decided by the board at the
same session at which they are heard, unless good cause for delay
thereof be shown and entered of record." Those requirements are
essential to the speedy and expeditious determination of the rights
of claimants for workers' compensation benefits and are,
therefore, mandatory."64
Justice McHugh held in Fausnet v. State Workers' Compensation
Commissioner,Workers CompensationAppeal Board865 that
[a]n employee injured in another state in the course of and
resulting from his employment is entitled to seek workers'
86

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

864

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5 (alterations in original).

865

327 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1985).
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compensation benefits in West Virginia, where the employee's
employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature
within the meaning of W.Va. Code, 23-2-1 [1976], and W.Va.
Code, 23-2-la [1975], under which statutes "employers" and
"employees" subject to this State's workers' compensation laws
are determined. 6 6
The case of Deller v. Naymick86 7 required Justice McHugh to determine the
applicability of the co-employee immunity from suit to a doctor employed by a
subscriber to the workers' compensation fund or by a self-insured employer, and
the effect, if any, of carrying liability insurance on such immunity. The court held
initially that
[a] professional person is an "employee" for workers'
compensation purposes when he or she provides his or her
services "to an employer largely to the exclusion of otherwise
special employment, for a certain fixed and determined period, at
a regular salary, and hold[s] [himself or868herself] in readiness at all
times to serve [his or her] employer[.]
The court in Deller then held:
If a doctor, who is employed by a subscriber to the Workmen's
[Workers'] Compensation Fund to render medical and surgical aid
and treatment to its employees, is so unskil[l]ful and negligent in
his treatment of an employee, injured in the course of and
resulting from his employment, that the injury is aggravated
thereby, such action on the part of the doctor comes within the
[Workers'] Compensation Act. Therefore, under such a state of
facts, an action is not maintainable against the doctor. 869
Justice McHugh noted in Deller that "[t]he so-called 'dual capacity' or
'dual persona' doctrine does not except a full-time, salaried doctor employed by a
subscriber to the Workers' Compensation Fund or by a self-insured employer from
the immunity provided by W.Va. Code, 23-2-6a [1949].,,870 The court concluded
that "[t]he immunity from tort liability provided by W.Va. Code, 23-2-6a [1949] is
not waived to the extent that liability insurance coverage is available." 87'
866

Id. at Syl.

867

342 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1985).

868

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 (alterations in original).

869

Id. at Syl. PL 2 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

870

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

671

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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Justice McHugh stated in Williams v. Robinson8 72 that "W.Va. Code,
23-4-6(a), (b) and (d) [1986], and W.Va. Code, 23-4-14 [1986], when read in pari
materia, require the Workers' Compensation Commissioner to recalculate
permanent
total disability benefits annually, based on the state average weekly
873
wage."
In the case of Dalton v. Spieler,874 Justice McHugh held:
Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 23-4-7a(c)(1), as amended, when an
authorized treating physician recommends a permanent partial
disability award of fifteen percent or less, and such
recommendation is based upon an examination performed prior to
the closing of a claimant's temporary total disability benefits, then
the workers' compensation commissioner has a mandatory duty to
enter an award of permanent partial disability benefits based upon
the recommendation of the authorized treating physician. 875
In Pannell v. Inco Alloys International,Inc.,878 Justice McHugh restricted
the reach of a statute giving employees a cause of action against employers, if they
are terminated while recovering from work-related injuries. The court stated that
"[a]bsent a clear expression by the legislature that retroactive application was
intended, W.Va. Code, 23-5A-3 [1990], which confers substantial rights on injured
employees, must be applied prospectively."8 77
Justice McHugh ruled in Pugh v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner87 8
that
W.Va. Code, 23-4-16 [1983], in part, permits the power and
jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner to
continue over cases before the Commissioner and to make
modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders
as may be justified, provided that no further award may be made
in the cases of nonfatal injuries more than two times within five
years after the Commissioner shall have made the last payment in
the original award or any subsequent increase thereto in any

872

376 S.E.2d 304 (W. Va. 1988).

873

Id.at Syl. Pt. 1.

874

401 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1990).

875

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

876

422 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1992).

877

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

878

424 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1992).
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permanent disability case.8 79

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of physician confidentiality in
workers' compensation in Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co.880 Justice McHugh
wrote:
A fiduciary relationship exists between a treating physician and a
claimant in a workers' compensation proceeding. This fiduciary
relationship prohibits oral ex parte communication which involves
providing confidential information and any other ex parte
communication which involves providing confidential information
which is not authorized under the statutes or procedural rules
governing a workers' compensation claim between the treating
physician and the adversarial party. When a claimant files a
workers' compensation claim, he does consent to the release of
written medical reports to the adversarial party pursuant to W. Va.
Code, 23-4-7 [1991]; however, this consent does not waive the
existing fiduciary relationship thereby permitting ex parte oral
communication between the physician and the adversarial party
which involves providing confidential information unrelated to the
written medical reports authorized by W.Va. Code, 23-4-7
[1991].881

Justice McHugh ruled in Bush v. Richardson8 82 that
[b]y the enactment of W.Va. Code, 23-2A-1 [1990], which
provides that the Commissioner of Workers' Compensation "shall
be allowed subrogation" when a workers' compensation claimant
collects moneys from a third-party tortfeasor, the legislature
expressly modified the usual, ordinary meaning of subrogation as
it is used in that Code section by making the made-whole rule
inapplicable. Therefore, the following provisions set forth by the
legislature in W.Va. Code, 23-2A-l(b) [1990] shall be followed:
"[T]he commissioner or a self-insured employer shall be allowed
subrogation with regard to medical benefits paid as of the date of
the recovery: Provided, That under no circumstances shall any
moneys received by the commissioner or self-insured employer as
subrogation to medical benefits expended on behalfof the injured
or deceased worker exceed fifty percent of the amount received

879

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

880

446 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1994).

881

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

882

484 S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 1997).
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from the third party as a result of the claim made by the injured
worker, his or her dependents or personal representative, after
payment of attorney's fees and costs, if such exist (emphasis
added)." m
K.

PrivateHospitalEmployee Discipline

In Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc.," Justice McHugh
outlined minimum procedural requirements private hospitals must utilize in
determining disciplinary measures against medical staff, in addition to setting out
the degree of judicial review of such procedures. The court held:
The decision of a private hospital to revoke, suspend, restrict or to
refuse to renew the staff appointment or clinical privileges of a
medical staff member is subject to limited judicial review to
ensure that there was substantial compliance with the hospital's
medical staff bylaws governing such a decision, as well as to
ensure that the medical staff bylaws afford basic notice and fair
hearing procedures, including an impartial tribunal.8
It was further concluded that
[a] private or a public hospital, regardless of the breadth of
discretion that is extended to it, may revoke or otherwise affect
adversely the staff appointment or clinical privileges of a medical
staff member only if, as an element of basic notice, the medical
staff bylaws provide a reasonably definite standard proscribing the
conduct upon which the revocation or other adverge action is
based. 88 6
Justice McHugh indicated that
[a] hospital may adopt and enforce a medical staff bylaw
providing that the disruptive conduct of a physician, in the sense
of his or her inability to work in harmony with other health care
personnel at the hospital, is a ground for denying, suspending,
restricting, refusing to renew or revoking the staff appointment or
clinical privileges of the offending physician, when such inability
may have an adverse impact upon overall patient care at the

883

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (alterations in original).

84

404 S.E.2d 750 (W. Va. 1991).

885

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

886

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 18
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

hospital.887
The court concluded that "[t]he decision of a private hospital revoking or
otherwise affecting adversely the staff appointment or clinical privileges of a
medical staff member will be sustained when, as an element of fair hearing
procedures, there is substantial evidence supporting that decision. ''
L.

Suspension of Government Employee

Justice McHugh observed in Parham v. Raleigh County Board of
Education89 that "[t]he authority of a county board of education to suspend a
listed
teacher under W.Va. Code, 18A-2-8 [1990] must be based upon the causes
890
therein and must be exercised reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously."
M.

Collective BargainingAgreement

Several issues concerned with collective bargaining were presented to
Justice McHugh in Local Division No. 812 of Clarksburg, West Virginia, of
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Central West Virginia Transit Authority.8 91 The
court held at the outset:
In determining whether or not the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement have agreed to submit a particular dispute to
arbitration, it must be recognized that there is a presumption
favoring arbitration, and this presumption may be rebutted only
where it can be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. 892
The court held next that "[p]rocedural questions arising from a labor
dispute and bearing on its final disposition are matters to be determined by an
arbitrator. 8 93 Justice McHugh ended the opinion by holding:
Where a transit authority has entered into a collective bargaining
agreement to submit "[a]ll grievances arising between the Transit
Authority and union" to arbitration and W.Va. Code, 8-27-21(g)
887

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

888

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

889

453 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1994).

890

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

891

365 S.E.2d 76 (W. Va. 1987).

892

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

893

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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[1969] provides that the transit authority or any employees thereof
have the right to submit to final and binding arbitration "any labor
dispute relating to the terms and conditions of employment which
is not settled through any established grievance procedure," an
employee discharge falls within the definition of "terms and
conditions of employment" and, accordingly, the matter of an
employee discharge should be submitted to arbitration. 8"
N.

Employment Contract

Justice McHugh confronted the issue of a lifetime employment contract in
Williamson v. Sharvest Management Co.895 The court held:
An implied lifetime employment contract may be enforceable
where the employee furnishes sufficient consideration in addition
to those services incident to the terms of his or her employment.
However, if the intent of the parties is clear and unequivocal that a
lifetime employment contract exists, there is no requirement for
additional consideration. 6
0.

ParentalLeave

Justice McHugh addressed the Parental Leave Act in the case of Hudok v.
Boardof EducationofRandolph County.897 The court held:
The plain language of WVa. Code, 21-5D-4 [1989] mandates
unpaid parental leave for up to twelve weeks, after the exhaustion
of all annual and personal leave, during any twelve-month period,
because of the birth of a child of an employee covered by the
Parental Leave Act, W.Va. Code, 21-5D-1 to 21-5D-9 [1989]. The
legislature, by including employees of "any county board of
education in the state" in its definition of employees under W.Va.
Code, 21-5D-2 [1989], clearly intended to grant parental leave
rights to school teachers under the Parental Leave Act.8 98

894

Id at Syl. Pt. 3 (alteration in original).

895

415 S.E.2d 271 (W. Va. 1992).

898

Id at Syl. Pt. 2.

897

415 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1992).

898

l at Syl. Pt. 3.
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Public Employee Retirement System

Justice McHugh indicated in West Virginia Public Employees Retirement
System v. Dodd 99 that "[a]t common law, as under W.Va. Code, 5-IOA-1 to

5-10A-10 [1976], a public officer's or public employee's service must be honorable
at all times, and if not, there is a total forfeiture of the public pension." 9°° The case
also addressed constitutional attacks on a statute providing for disqualification of
retirement benefits. The court held:
The Act on the "Disqualification for Public Retirement Plan
Benefits," W.Va. Code, 5-IOA-1 to 5-IOA-10 [1976], is not
unconstitutional as cruel and unusual, or disproportionate,
punishment (W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5), as a bill of attainder or
bill of pain and penalties or an ex post facto law (W. Va. Const.
art. III, § 4), as an impairment of contract (W. Va. Const. art. III, §
4), as a deprivation of property without due process of law (W.
Va. Const. art. III, § 10) or as a forfeiture of estate (W. Va. Const.
art. III, § 18). Furthermore, that Act is exempt, under 29 U.S.C. §
1003(b)(1) (1988), from the section of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, on nonforfeitability of
a normal retirement benefit, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1988). 90'
In State ex rel. Dadisman v. Caperton,0 2 Justice McHugh stated:

Where the mandate of an opinion of this Court requires a
determination of whether the Public Employees Retirement
System has been rendered actuarially unsound by past
underfunding and, if so, requires appropriations which will return
the System to actuarial soundness to be made, such appropriations
are not necessary if it is determined that the System
903 has not been
rendered actuarially unsound by that underfunding.
Justice McHugh said in State ex rel. Lambert v. County Commission of
Boone County9 4 that

[t]he West Virginia Public Employees Retirement Act, set forth in
W.Va. Code, 5-10-1, et seq., must be read in pari materia with the
899

396 S.E.2d 725 (W. Va. 1990).

900

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

901

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

902

413 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991).

903

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

904

452 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1994).
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West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Act, set forth in W.Va.
Code, 5-16-1, et seq. (specifically, §§ 2(7), 10, 22 and 24 of
chapter 5, article 16 of the W.Va. Code). These statutes relate to
providing benefits to retired employees who participate in the
Public Employees Retirement System. Therefore, employers who
elect to participate in the Public Employees Retirement System
must, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 5-16-22 [1992], contribute to the
Public Employees Insurance Agency when its retired employee
elects to participate in the Public Employees Insurance Agency.
After all, it is by virtue of the employer's participation in the
Public Employees Retirement System that the retired employee
has the option of electing to participate in the Public Employees
Insurance Agency. 905
Justice McHugh wrote in In re Appeal or JudicialReview of Decision of
West Virginia ConsolidatedPublicRetirement Board'06 that
[p]ursuant to W.Va. Code, 5-10-2(6) [1988], an individual is an
employee for membership in the Public Employees Retirement
System if such individual is employed full time and his or her
tenure is not restricted as to temporary or provisional appointment.
These requirements apply to any person who serves regularly as
an officer or employee, on a salary basis, in the service of, and
whose compensation is payable, in whole or in part, by any
political subdivision, as well as to an officer or employee whose
compensation is calculated on a daily basis and paid monthly or
on completion of assignment. 907
Q.

Health Care Plan

In State ex rel. City of Wheeling RetireesAss'n, Inc. v. City of Wheeling,908
Justice McHugh determined whether health care rates charged to retirees could be
different from the rates charged regular employees. The court held:
W.Va. Code, 8-12-8 [1986] provides, in part, that "[i]n the event
that a municipality changes insurance carriers, as a condition
precedent to any such change, the municipality shall assure that all
retirees .... are guaranteed acceptance, at the same cost for the

same coverage as regular employees of similar age groupings[.]"
However, because W.Va. Code, 8-12-8 [1986] is remedial, and,
905

Maat Syl. Pt 2.

905

476 S.E.2d 185 (W. Va. 1996).

907

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

908

407 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1991).
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therefore, to be liberally construed, even though the municipality
does not change insurance carriers, retirees who are insured under
the provisions of this section are to be insured at the same cost for
the same coverage as regular employees of similar age groupings
where the present insurance carrier changes its rates and such
change results in retirees being charged different rates for the
same coverage as regular employees. 90 9
R.

DeliberateIntention Action Against Employer
Justice McHugh stated in Sias v. W-P Coal Co.910 that
[t]he portion of the statute which authorizes "prompt judicial
resolution" of "deliberate intention" actions against employers,
specifically, W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(iii)(B) [1983, 1991], relates
to plaintiffs' more specific substantive law burden under the
five-element test of W.Va. Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(E) [1983,
1991], but the preexisting procedural law still applies for granting
employers' motions for summary judgment, directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.91'

S.

FederalEmployers' Liability Act

Justice McHugh held in Gardner v. CSX Transportation,Inc.912 that "[t]o
prevail on a claim under The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1939), a plaintiff employee must establish that the defendant employer acted
negligently and that such negligence contributed proximately, in whole or in part,
to plaintiffs injury." 913
Justice McHugh elaborated upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act in
the case of McGraw v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. 914 He noted:
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1939), inter alia, "[e]very common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce . . . shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his
or her personal representative . . . for such injury or death

909

Id. at Syl. (alterations in original).

910

408 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1991).

911

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
410 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1997).

912
913

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

914

500 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1997).
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resulting in whole or in part from the negligence
915 of any of the
officers, agents, or employees of such carrier[.]"
Justice McHugh held next that
[p]ursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1948), federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction of claims brought under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939). Although a state
court may use procedural rules applicable to civil actions in the
state court unless otherwise directed by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, substantive issues under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act are determined by the provisions of the statute and
interpretative decisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
given by the federal courts.916
The court continued in McGraw and held that
[u]nder the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1939), to establish that a railroad breached its duty to provide its
employees with a safe workplace, the plaintiff must show
circumstances which a railroad, in the exercise of due care,
91 7 could
have reasonably foreseen as creating a potential for harm.
It was further heldd that
[u]nder the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1939), even though the foreseeable danger to an employee is
from intentional or criminal misconduct, an employer nevertheless
has a duty to make reasonable provision against it. Breach of that
duty would be negligence and whether the employee's injury was
the result, in whole918or in part, from such negligence, is a question
of fact for the jury.
Justice McHugh concluded in McGraw that "[b]ecause the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939), inter alia, imposes liability upon
an employer for 'the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees' of
such employer, under the act, a railroad may be liable for the negligence of any
railroad employee. 91 9

915

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3 (alterations in original).

916

Id at Syl. PL 4.

917

Id

918

Id at Syl. Pt. 6.

919

Id at Syl.PL 8.

at Syl. Pt. 5.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

21

